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Abstract 
How do we acquire a mental representation of our own face? Recently, 
synchronous, but not asynchronous, interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) 
between one’s own and another person’s face was used to evoke changes in self-
identification (enfacement illusion). We investigated the conscious experience of 
these changes with principal component analyses (PCA) that revealed that while the 
conscious experience during synchronous IMS focused on resemblance and 
similarity with the other’s face, during asynchronous IMS it focused on multisensory 
stimulation. Analyses on the identified common factor structure revealed significant 
quantitative differences between synchronous and asynchronous IMS on self-
identification and perceived similarity with the other’s face. Experiment 2 revealed 
that participants with lower interoceptive sensitivity experienced stronger enfacement 
illusion. Overall, self-identification and body-ownership rely on similar basic 
mechanisms of multisensory integration, but the effects of multisensory input on their 
experience are qualitatively different, possibly underlying the face’s unique role as a 
marker of selfhood. 
 
Keywords: self-face representation; multisensory integration; mirror-recognition; 
self-identity; enfacement illusion. 
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1. Introduction 
Nothing provides so strong a sense of self as seeing one’s own face reflected 
in a mirror. The familiarity and ease of everyday self-recognition masks the 
sophistication of this ability, and how rare it is in the animal kingdom. The face is the 
most distinctive feature of our physical appearance, and one of the key ways by 
which we become known as individuals, both to ourselves and to others. 
Traditionally, the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is taken as evidence of a 
basic form of self awareness in non-human primates (de Waal, Dindo, Freeman & 
Hall, 2005; Gallup, 1970) and human infants (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978). This 
ability for self-recognition is claimed to be especially fundamental to the awareness 
of being a self among others like us (Zahavi & Roepstorff, 2011), upon which more 
complex forms of self-identity are built, such as a diachronic sense of self (Povinelli 
& Simon, 1998). 
At the ontogenetic level, the formation of a mental representation of what we 
look like poses two challenges. The first challenge relates to how a mental 
representation of facial appearance is acquired in the first place. Given that the infant 
cannot have a priori knowledge of her appearance, the infant encountering a mirror 
for the first time must succeed in matching her sensorimotor experience with the 
observed sensorimotor behavior of the object seen inside the mirror. This matching 
between felt and observed sensorimotor signals will lead to the formation of a mental 
representation of visual appearance (i.e., “that is my body reflected in the mirror; 
therefore that is what I look like”). This process of self-identification allows successful 
performance in the classic ‘rouge’ task of mirror self-recognition, in which infants are 
exposed to their mirror reflection and their response to a spot of rouge covertly 
applied to their nose is registered (e.g., they might respond by touching their own 
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nose; see Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Second, as our physical appearance 
changes over time, the mental representation of what we look like should possess 
sufficient plasticity to ensure both the assimilation of changes and a sense of 
continuity over time. It is therefore important to distinguish between three key 
processes: (1) self-identification, which allows for the construction and acquisition of 
a mental representation of appearance; (2) self-recognition, which allows for the 
maintenance of a stored mental representation; and (3) self-updating, which allows 
for assimilation of physical changes that will eventually be reflected in the mental 
representation. 
While the question of maintenance of a self-face representation has been 
addressed in several studies with adults (see Devue & Brédart (2011) for a review), 
the neurocognitive mechanisms that allow us to acquire, maintain and update a 
mental representation of our own face remain incompletely understood. Typically, in 
self-recognition studies, participants are asked to judge the identity of a static visual 
stimulus, often a morphed face that contains different percentages of self and other. 
This process requires a comparison between the static viewed picture and a stored 
visual representation of one’s own face. However, at the ontogenetic level, the initial 
acquisition of a mental self-face representation cannot be explained by this process 
of comparing an external stimulus to a mental representation because a mental 
representation of what we look like does not exist a priori. Instead, it is the infants’ 
ability to integrate online sensorimotor signals with visual feedback during mirror 
exposure that allows them to realize that the face with the rouge spot that they see in 
the mirror is their own. Thus, the mental representation of what we look like is given 
to us by the continuous integration and match of what we feel on our face with what 
we see on the reflected face. Accumulative multisensory experiences during mirror 
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exposure may allow for the update of the mental representation of our own face as 
we age, although the continuity and plasticity of self-face representations as we age 
are issues that remain to be explored. How is a mental representation of one’s own 
face acquired, maintained and updated over time? 
Recent studies (Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard & Aglioti, 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, 
Grehl & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008) have capitalized on the known role of 
multisensory integration for body-awareness (for a review see Tsakiris, 2010) to 
investigate the effect of on-line multisensory stimulation on self-face representations. 
Seeing another person’s face being touched at the same time as one’s face, evokes 
a change in the mental representation of one’s face, which can be measured by 
performance on a self-face recognition task. Synchronous, but not asynchronous, 
visuo-tactile stimulation between the two faces changes the categorical boundary 
between self and other, by shifting it towards the other’s face, so that a higher 
percentage of the other face is assimilated in the mental representation of one’s 
face. This “enfacement illusion” has been shown to be dependent on empathic traits, 
such as the ability to adopt the point of view of others and to share their emotions 
(Sforza, et al., 2010), as well as to influence social cognition processes, such as 
those involved in inference and conformity tasks (Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani & 
Schubert, 2011). 
While these studies present converging evidence in favor of the effect of 
multisensory stimulation on self-face representations, a systematic investigation of 
the experience of identifying oneself with a face is still lacking. The aforementioned 
studies have shed some light on this question by suggesting that I identify with the 
face I see, not only because it matches a stored visual representation of my face, but 
also because I see the face being touched when I feel touch myself. Still, we know 
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little about how one consciously perceives these different aspects of identifying with 
one’s face in the mirror.  
 
1.1 Present study 
We consider the enfacement illusion to be a model instance of self-
identification, in an analogous way to the phenomenology of embodiment in illusions 
of body-ownership, such as the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998). Understanding the experience of self-identification as studied in the 
enfacement illusion can shed light on the processes by which we come to acquire 
and update a mental representation of our physical appearance.  
Thus, our first aim was to apply a rigorous psychometric method to 
decompose the conscious bodily experience of self-identification during enfacement 
into theoretically useful and distinct subcomponents. The experimental manipulation 
of the temporal correlation of visuo-tactile stimulation allows for controlled 
investigation of the phenomenology of self-identification. In Experiment 1, we 
adopted the psychometric approach of Longo and colleagues (Longo, Schüür, 
Kammers, Tsakiris & Haggard, 2008) that has been previously used to characterize 
the alteration of the conscious bodily experience as a function of the pattern of 
multisensory stimulation in the rubber hand illusion. Our aim was to investigate the 
changes in the experience of self-identification caused by multisensory stimulation, 
in order to understand the psychological construct of a mental representation of 
one’s face and to motivate future research on the malleability of self-representations.  
We also aimed to investigate the effect of individual differences such as age 
on the strength of the enfacement illusion. The mental representations of one’s face 
are acquired and updated through accumulative multisensory experiences during 
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mirror exposure. Therefore, it might be hypothesized that the plasticity of self-face 
representations might depend on the number of mirror experiences and/or on the 
frequency of body changes experienced by a person, which are age-related. The 
little evidence on the rate of changes in facial appearance suggests that larger 
changes occur during adolescence and into early adulthood, and then again in later 
adulthood (after 40 years old; see Bishara, 2000; Farkas, Eiben, Sivkov, Tompson, 
Katic & Forrest, 2004). Larger changes in the facial appearance may require a higher 
degree of plasticity in the mental representation of one’s face that would allow the 
assimilation of these changes. Even though no studies have reported the effect of 
age on illusions of body-ownership, we believe that the plasticity of the mental body 
representations in response to body changes, a process we call self-updating, is key 
in the formation of a mental body-representation, together with, but distinct to, self-
identification and self-recognition processes, as introduced above. We therefore 
aimed at further investigating age-related effects on the enfacement illusion. 
Our last aim was to use the findings from the principal component analyses 
(PCA) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) performed in Experiment 1 to study 
how the magnitude of the malleability of self-identification during exteroceptive 
stimulation correlates with the interoceptive sensitivity of the body. Recent studies 
have shown that multisensory integration and resulting effects on the experience of 
the body depend on (Kammers, Rose & Haggard, 2011) and affect (Moseley, Olthof, 
Venema, Don, Wijers, et al., 2008) the physiological condition of the body and, 
further, that they depend on one’s sensitivity to the physiological condition of one’s 
body (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez & Costantini, 2011). Interoceptive sensitivity (i.e., 
the sensitivity to the physiological state of one’s body) is usually assessed by 
quantifying performance in a heartbeat perception task (Schandry, 1981). 
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Interestingly, the malleability of body-representations following multisensory 
stimulation during the RHI has been shown to correlate negatively with interoceptive 
sensitivity: people with low interoceptive sensitivity experienced a stronger RHI 
suggesting that sensitivity of individuals to their internal state is linked to the strength 
of their self-representation (Tsakiris, et al., 2011). Therefore, Experiment 2 
investigated how the strength of enfacement, which reflects the malleability of the 
self as perceived from the outside, is linked to the perception of and sensitivity to the 
self from within, as measured by the degree of interoceptive sensitivity. We predicted 
that people with low interoceptive sensitivity will experience a stronger enfacement 
illusion than people with high interoceptive sensitivity, showing the modulatory effect 
of interoceptive sensitivity on the malleability of the self-face representation. 
 
2. Experiment 1: The phenomenology of self-identification 
2.1 Material and methods 
2.1.1 Participants  
Two hundred and fifty six volunteers (140 female; Mage ± SD = 25.6 ± 5; range: 
17-38) gave their informed consent to participate. For the 3 participants under 18 
years old, parental consent was obtained. Participants were visitors of the “Who am 
I?” gallery, at the London Science Museum, as part of the museum’s Live Science 
program. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, 
Psychology Department, Royal Holloway, University of London. 
2.1.2 Apparatus and materials 
A 60 s “induction movie" displayed the face of an unfamiliar individual of the 
same gender as the participant being touched on the right cheek with a cotton-bud. 
Touches occurred with a frequency of approximately 0.5 Hz and covered a distance 
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of approximately 2 cm from the zygomatic bone downwards. For each gender, two 
different movies displaying an unknown individual were produced. The individuals 
displayed were approximately 23 years old (age range: 20-25).  
The movies were presented in full screen mode with a 20'' LCD-screen 
positioned 50 cm away from participants. A keyboard and Presentation® software 
were used to control stimuli delivery and collect participants’ responses. 
2.1.3 Procedure  
While participants watched at the other’s face being touched in the induction 
movie, the experimenter touched the participants’ own face with an identical cotton 
bud on the specular congruent location either synchronously or asynchronously with 
a lag of approximately 1 s. One synchronous and one asynchronous trial were 
presented, with order randomized, to each participant. The pair of movies presented 
to the participants was matched with their gender (this resulted in N=114, 61 female, 
exposed first to the synchronous condition and in N=142, 79 female, exposed first to 
the asynchronous condition). Which individual was displayed in the synchronous and 
which in the asynchronous condition was randomized across participants.  
The subjective experience of participants during each visuo-tactile condition 
was assessed with a questionnaire containing eighteen statements, presented in 
random order. Participants rated their level of agreement with the statements using a 
7-item Likert scale. A response of 7 indicated that they “strongly agreed”, 1 that they 
“strongly disagreed” and 4 that they “neither agreed nor disagreed” with the 
statement. The statements were based on previous studies of multisensory-induced 
bodily illusions (e.g., Longo, et al., 2008; Sforza, et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, et 
al., 2012) and on qualitative pilot research with four participants who were asked to 
freely describe their experiences during the illusion. The statements were designed 
10 
 
to cover a wide range of possible experiences participants may have when exposed 
to synchronous and asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation on their own face and the 
face of someone else that they are looking at.  
2.2 Results 
The mean and standard deviation for the answers to each of the statements 
for both synchronous and asynchronous conditions are shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Mean responses (± SD) to the statements for synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions. The level of agreement with the statements was rated 
using a 7-item Likert scale. A response of 7 indicated “strongly agreed”, 1 “strongly 
disagreed” and 4 “neither agreed nor disagreed” with the statement. 
 
Item During the visuo-tactile stimulation… Synchronous Asynchronous t p 
1 "The touch I felt was caused by the cotton bud 
touching the other's face" 
2.73 (1.8)  2.11 (1.6) 4.94 .000 
2 "The touch I saw on the other's face was 
caused by the cotton bud touching my own 
face" 
2.99 (2) 2.07 (1.5) 8.13 .000 
3 "I felt like the other's face was my face"  2.97 (1.9) 2.02 (1.4) 8.18 .000 
4 "It seemed like the other's face belonged to me" 2.72 (1.7) 1.96 (1.4) 7.12 .000 
5 "It seemed like I was looking at my own mirror 
reflection"  
2.97 (1.8) 2.13 (1.5) 7.09 .000 
6 "It seemed like the other's face began to 
resemble my own face"  
3.35 (1.9) 2.63 (1.6) 5.73 .000 
7 "It seemed like my own face began to resemble 
the other person's face"  
3.25 (1.9) 2.54 (1.6) 5.65 .000 
8 "It seemed like I was in control of the other's 
face"  
2.68 (1.8) 2.05 (1.3) 5.72 .000 
9 "It seemed like my own face was out of my 
control"  
2.85 (1.7) 2.58 (1.7) 2.43 .016 
10 "It seemed like the experience of my face was 
less vivid than normal"  
3.55 (1.7) 3.29 (1.7) 2.08 .039 
11 "It seemed like the face of the person in the 
video was similar to mine"  
3.62 (1.8) 2.95 (1.7) 5.77 .000 
12 "It seemed like my face was similar to the face 
of the person in the video" 
3.71 (1.8) 2.97 (1.7) 5.97 .000 
13 "It seemed like the person in the video was 
attractive"  
3.89 (1.5) 3.63 (1.5) 2.35 .019 
14 "It seemed like the person in the video was 
trustworthy"  
4.46 (1.5) 4.20 (1.4) 2.62 .009 
15 "I felt that I was imitating the other person"  3.60 (2) 3.02 (1.9) 3.93 .000 
16 "I felt that other person was imitating me"  2.84 (1.7) 2.39 (1.7) 3.23 .001 
17 "I felt that I blinked when the other person 
blinked"  
3.40 (2.1) 2.81 (1.9) 3.56 .000 
18 "I felt affiliated with the person in the video"  3.91 (1.8) 3.32 (1.8) 4.15 .000 
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2.2.1 Dimensions underlying the introspective reports  
The dimensions underlying the experience of enfacement were investigated 
with PCA with varimax orthogonal rotation. Separate PCAs were conducted for the 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. The Kayser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
verified the sampling adequacy for the analyses (KMO = .921 for the synchronous 
condition and KMO = .891 for the asynchronous condition; all KMO values for 
individual items were > .712, which is well above the acceptable limit of .5; see Field, 
2011). Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that correlations between items were 
sufficiently large for PCA (for synchronous condition Χ2(153) = 2496.3; p < .001; for 
asynchronous condition Χ2(153) = 1917.5; p < .001).  
In the synchronous condition, analyses of eigenvalues and the scree plot led 
to the extraction of three components which together accounted for 59.4% of the 
variance in the data (see Table 2). We considered the items that loaded strongly 
(>.05; cf. Longo, et al., 2008) in each component. The first principal component “Syn-
C1” accounted for a large proportion of this variance (44.6%), and included 
statements relating to feelings that the other person’s face resembled or actually was 
one’s own face, that one’s own face resembled the other person’s face, that the 
other person’s face belonged to oneself, and that one was looking at one’s own 
mirror reflection (statements 3-7, 11-12). The second principal component “Syn-C2” 
included statements relating to feelings of a causal relationship between the touch of 
the cotton bud in the movie and on one’s own face, of being in control of the other 
person’s face or one’s face being out of one’s control, of one’s face being less vivid 
than normal and that one was imitating or being imitated by the other person 
(statements 1-2, 8-10, 15-17). Finally, the third principal component “Syn-C3” 
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included statements that related to the feelings of the other person being attractive 
and trustworthy (statements 13-14).  
In the asynchronous condition, analysis of eigenvalues and the scree plot led 
to the extraction of five components which together accounted for 64.5% of the 
variance in the data (see Table 2). The first principal component “Asyn-C1” 
accounted for a large proportion of the variance (35%), and included statements 
relating to feelings of a causal relationship between the touch of the cotton bud in the 
movie and one’s own face, of the other person’s face being one’s own face, of 
owning and being in control of the other person’s face, and of looking at one’s own 
mirror reflection (statements 1-5, 8). The second principal component “Asyn-C2” 
included four statements that related to the feelings of the other person’s face 
beginning to resemble and being similar to one’s own face, as well as feelings of 
one’s face beginning to resemble and being similar to the other person’s face 
(statements 6-7, 11-12). The third principal component “Asyn-C3” included 
statements that related to feelings of being imitated by the other person, of one’s 
blinks being synchronous with the other person’s blinks, and of affiliation with the 
other person (statements 16-18). The fourth principal component “Asyn-C4” included 
two statements that related to the feelings of the other person being attractive and 
trustworthy (statements 13-14). Finally, the fifth principal component “Asyn-C5” 
included two statements that related to feelings of one’s face being out of one’s 
control and the experience of one’s face being less vivid than normal (statements 9-
10). The presence of this last component only in the asynchronous condition 
provides further evidence of a substantially different underlying experience in 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. This is reminiscent of the “deafference” 
component identified following asynchronous stimulation in the RHI (Longo, et al., 
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2008), which related to the sensations of pins and needles and numbness in the 
participant’s hand, as well as to the experience of their hand being less vivid than 
normal, during asynchronous stimulation. 
Overall, the central dimensions identified by the PCA provide evidence of 
important differences underlying the subjective experience of participants between 
the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions. The structure of the component 
accounting for a large proportion of the variance was not exactly the same in the two 
conditions. In the synchronous condition, for example, sensorimotor experiences 
related to touch split to form their own component. Further, the substantial 
differences between the other components in both conditions, and in particular, the 
presence of “Asyn-C5” representing the “loss of one’s face” in the asynchronous 
condition, provide evidence of qualitative differences underlying the experience of 
enfacement in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, which are further 
discussed in the General Discussion. 
15 
 
Table 2. Summary of factor loadings resulting from the principal component analyses with Varimax Rotation ran separately for the 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 
 Synchronous  Asynchronous 
  
   
Item During the visuo-tactile stimulation… Syn-C1 Syn-C2 Syn-C3 Commu-
nalities 
 Asyn-C1 Asyn-C2 Asyn-C3 Asyn-C4 Asyn-C5 Commu-
nalities 
             
1 "The touch I felt was caused by the 
cotton bud touching the other's face" 
.311 .552 .079 .408  .714 -.010 .018 .136 .102 .539 
2 "The touch I saw on the other's face was 
caused by the cotton bud touching my 
own face" 
.249 .648 -.076 .487  .599 .138 .067 -.321 .191 .522 
3 "I felt like the other's face was my face" .733 .400 .059 .700  .670 .425 .123 -.042 .138 .666 
4 "It seemed like the other's face belonged 
to me" 
.741 .405 .113 .726  .711 .449 .141 .043 .067 .734 
5 "It seemed like I was looking at my own 
mirror reflection" 
.742 .347 .167 .699  .695 .432 .165 .000 -.076 .703 
6 "It seemed like the other's face began to 
resemble my own face" 
.807 .263 .121 .734  .486 .600 .186 .052 .190 .669 
7 "It seemed like my own face began to 
resemble the other person's face" 
.715 .403 .135 .692  .414 .686 .109 .074 .187 .694 
8 "It seemed like I was in control of the 
other's face" 
.475 .644 .066 .645  .754 .157 .140 -.008 -.051 .616 
9 "It seemed like my own face was out of 
my control" 
.205 .691 .204 .562  .484 .016 -.005 .219 .548 .583 
10 "It seemed like the experience of my 
face was less vivid than normal" 
.204 .552 -.124 .362  -.032 .249 .030 -.112 .794 .707 
11 "It seemed like the face of the person in 
the video was similar to mine" 
.791 .135 .345 .763  .230 .830 .098 .203 .125 .807 
12 "It seemed like my face was similar to 
the face of the person in the video" 
.753 .198 .335 .718  .163 .831 .096 .227 .111 .789 
13 "It seemed like the person in the video 
was attractive" 
.193 -.050 .727 .569  -.027 .158 -.049 .764 .062 .615 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Note. Factor loadings stronger than 0.5 are in boldface.  
 
 Synchronous  Asynchronous 
  
   
Item During the visuo-tactile stimulation… Syn-C1 Syn-C2 Syn-C3 Commu-
nalities 
 Asyn-C1 Asyn-C2 Asyn-C3 Asyn-C4 Asyn-C5 Commu-
nalities 
             
14 "It seemed like the person in the video 
was trustworthy" 
.141 .070 .758 .599  -.051 .433 -.010 .570 -.250 .578 
15 "I felt that I was imitating the other 
person" 
.169 .616 .436 .598  .359 .133 .267 .470 .387 .589 
16 "I felt that other person was imitating 
me" 
.261 .514 .136 .351  .227 .129 .593 -.164 .087 .454 
17 "I felt that I blinked when the other 
person blinked" 
.135 .550 .455 .528  .202 -.099 .783 .124 -.003 .679 
18 "I felt affiliated with the person in the 
video" 
.456 .353 .475 .558  -.108 .345 .731 .016 -.010 .666 
             
Eigenvalues 8.023 1.482 1.194   6.306 1.869 1.374 1.055 1.004  
% Variance Explained 44.572 8.232 6.631   35.035 10.385 7.631 5.863 5.580  
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2.2.2 Direct comparison between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation 
Our results provide evidence of qualitative differences underlying the 
experience of enfacement in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. In order 
to be able to directly compare across synchronous and asynchronous conditions, 
we, then, searched for the dimensions of experience which were common to both 
conditions by considering the average experience of both conditions. Importantly, 
prior to averaging, z-scores were calculated for each questionnaire item and 
condition to ensure that both conditions contributed equally to the observed variance. 
Then, the scores for synchronous and asynchronous conditions for each 
questionnaire item were averaged and entered into a single PCA. Varimax 
orthogonal rotation was used. The Kayser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the 
sampling adequacy for the analyses (KMO = .921; all KMO values for individual 
items were > .750). Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that correlations between 
items were sufficiently large for PCA (Χ2(153) = 2709.3; p < .001).  
Analyses of eigenvalues and the scree plot led to the extraction of three 
components which together accounted for 60.3% of the variance in the data (see 
Table 3). We considered the items that loaded strongly (>.05; cf. Longo, et al., 2008) 
in each component. The first principal component, which we labeled “self-
identification”, accounted for a large proportion of this variance (45%), and included 
statements relating to feelings of a causal relationship between the touch of the 
cotton bud in the movie and on one’s own face, feeling that the other person’s face 
resembled or actually was one’s own face, that the other person’s face belonged to 
oneself, that one was looking at one’s own mirror reflection, that one was in control 
of the other person’s face and that one was imitating or being imitated by the other 
person (statements 1-6, 8, 15-17). The second principal component, labeled 
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“similarity”, included statements relating to feelings that the other person’s and one’s 
face resembled or were similar to each other or that the experience of one’s face 
was less vivid than normal (statements 6-7, 10-12). Finally, the third principal 
component, labeled “affect”, included statements that related to the feelings of the 
other person being attractive and trustworthy (statements 13-14). It should be noted 
that the first two components identified (i.e., “self-identification” and “similarity”) 
match the first two key-processes involved in the formation of a mental 
representation of “what we look like” described in the introduction (i.e., “self-
identification” and “self-recognition”), while the third factor (i.e., “affect”), has also 
been identified in previous studies on embodiment, such as the changes in body-
ownership during the rubber hand illusion (Longo et al., 2008). 
Since the “self-identification” component accounted for a large proportion of 
the variance and was composed for items which suggested diverse, although 
related, experiences, we conducted an additional PCA, with the items that loaded 
strongly (>.05) on the “self-identification” component. No additional subcomponents 
were extracted, suggesting that the feelings comprising this component, which were 
identified in the primary analysis, are tightly interrelated in experience and are not 
dissociable. 
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Table 3. Summary of component loadings resulting from the principal component analysis with Varimax Rotation ran on the mean 
values for the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 
Note. Factor loadings stronger than 0.5 are in boldface.  
Item During the visuo-tactile stimulation… Self-identification Similarity Affect Communalities 
1 "The touch I felt was caused by the cotton bud touching the other's face" .683 .200 -.056 .509 
2 "The touch I saw on the other's face was caused by the cotton bud touching my own face" .729 .230 -.208 .628 
3 "I felt like the other's face was my face" .657 .481 .163 .690 
4 "It seemed like the other's face belonged to me" .704 .447 .246 .755 
5 "It seemed like I was looking at my own mirror reflection" .701 .375 .250 .695 
6 "It seemed like the other's face began to resemble my own face" .508 .621 .239 .700 
7 "It seemed like my own face began to resemble the other person's face" .491 .663 .232 .735 
8 "It seemed like I was in control of the other's face" .792 .290 .039 .713 
9 "It seemed like my own face was out of my control" .440 .494 -.016 .438 
10 "It seemed like the experience of my face was less vivid than normal" .131 .698 -.299 .594 
11 "It seemed like the face of the person in the video was similar to mine" .290 .688 .482 .790 
12 "It seemed like my face was similar to the face of the person in the video" .236 .709 .478 .788 
13 "It seemed like the person in the video was attractive" .115 -.041 .735 .555 
14 "It seemed like the person in the video was trustworthy" .002 .161 .685 .495 
15 "I felt that I was imitating the other person" .516 .315 .301 .456 
16 "I felt that other person was imitating me" .666 .092 .186 .487 
17 "I felt that I blinked when the other person blinked" .557 .061 .246 .374 
18 "I felt affiliated with the person in the video" .223 .466 .428 .449 
Eigenvalues 8.107 1.708 1.037  
% Variance Explained 45.041 9.487 5.762  
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In order to validate the proposed three-factor structure as a model fitting well 
both conditions, we used structural equation modelling. We fit a model for both 
conditions combined by using the model identified by the PCA on the mean scores 
across synchronous and asynchronous conditions to guide the construction of 
scales. We then used CFA to test whether the overall model provided a good fit for 
the two conditions combined, and then we tested the model allowing separate 
estimates for the two conditions separately. Hence, our hypothesized CFA structure 
comprised three factors: self-identification, similarity and affect. The variables 
measuring each factor were those identified by the PCA, the reliability of which is 
influenced by random measurement error. Each of the observed variables was 
regressed into its respective factor, and the three factors were intercorrelated (see 
Figure 1).  
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Structural equation modelling conducted in this model with equality 
constraints imposed to factor loadings, factor variances, factor covariances and error 
covariances confirmed that the model provided a reasonable fit with the data. 
Covarying error terms being part of the same factor and relaxing equality constraints, 
by keeping only those associated with factor loadings (following the procedure in 
Byrne, 1994), slightly improved the fits, with the fit indices confirming a good fit 
(relative χ2 = 1.67; GFI = .93; NFI = .93; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .036; see Byrne, 1994; 
Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Kline, 1998; Ullman, 2001). Then, we fit the model 
separately for the two conditions. CFA evidenced that the model fit equally well in 
both the synchronous (relative χ2 = 1.74; GFI = .94; NFI = .94; CFI = .97; RMSEA = 
.054) and asynchronous (relative χ2 = 1.78; GFI = .94; NFI = .92; CFI = .96; RMSEA 
= .054) conditions. This provides confirmation for the three-factor structure to be 
common to both synchronous and asynchronous conditions1. 
Once we identified the dimensions underlying the introspective experience of 
enfacement that were common to both synchronous and asynchronous conditions, 
we calculated for each condition three mean component scores by averaging the 
scores of the items that loaded in each component. These component scores, then, 
quantify the experience of the participants for each of the dimensions in the same 
Likert scale that participants used to give their ratings for each individual statement 
(summated scales; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006). They can be 
                                                 
1 An alternative model to the one proposed here was also considered. This model was based on the structure 
obtained from the synchronous condition and was comprised of three factors which we named self-identification 
(statements 3-7, 11-12), sensorimotor experience (statements 1-2, 8-10, 15-17) and affect (statements 13-14, 
18). The model was validated with a CFA with equality constraints imposed for the two conditions combined, 
and also allowing separate estimates for the two conditions separately. This model provided a reasonable fit with 
the data (for the two conditions combined: relative χ2 =2.186; GFI = .89; RMSEA = .048; for synchronous 
condition: relative χ2 = 2.124; GFI = .909; RMSEA = .066; for asynchronous condition: relative χ2 = 2.21; GFI 
= .908; RMSEA = .069), thus providing confirmation that the three-factor structure is, to some extent, common 
to both synchronous and asynchronous conditions. It is important to note, however, that this approach has the 
disadvantage that the extracted structure will, by definition, fit better the synchronous than the asynchronous 
condition, and that the approach adopted in this paper (i.e., the one which considers the means of the two 
conditions) provides a better fit. 
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used for direct comparison between synchronous and asynchronous conditions 
since they reflect an experience common to both conditions. 
The component scores were submitted in a mixed ANOVA with within-
subjects factors condition (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and component (“self-
identification”, “similarity” or “affect”), and between-subjects factors gender and the 
order of presentation (i.e., whether the synchronous or the asynchronous condition 
was first presented). The main effects of condition (F(1, 252) = 76.2, p < .0001, p2 = 
.23) and component (F(2, 504) = 193.8, p < .0001, p2 = .43) were significant, as well 
as their 2-way interaction (F(2, 504) = 13.2, p < .0001, p2 = .05). The significant 
effect of ‘condition’ indicates that, overall, participants agreed more with the 
statements after synchronous (M ± SE = 3.54 ± .07) than after asynchronous 
stimulation (M ± SE = 2.99 ± .05). The significant effect of ‘component’ indicates that, 
overall, participants agreed more with the statements comprising the component 
“affect” (M ± SE = 4.00 ± .06) than with those comprising the components “self-
identification” (M ± SE = 2.64 ± .06) and “similarity” (M ± SE = 3.16 ± .07), 
independent of the pattern of stimulation. The significant interaction (see Figure 2) 
was driven by a greater difference between the synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions for the ratings for the statements comprising the component scores “self-
identification” and “similarity” than for those comprising the component score “affect”. 
To investigate this interaction, we calculated the difference “synchronous minus 
asynchronous” for each component score. The resulting values reflect the magnitude 
of change in the subjective experience between the synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation. Paired samples t-tests showed that the magnitude of change for “affect” 
(M ± SE = .26 ± .09) was significantly smaller than the corresponding change for 
“self-identification” (M ± SE = .70 ± .07; t(255) = 4.55, p < .0001), and for “similarity” 
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Although gender did not significantly interact with the main effects or their 
interaction (all ps > .05), the between-subjects effect of gender was significant (F(1, 
252) = 13.94, p < .001, p2 = .05). Overall, females showed more agreement with the 
statements (M ± SE = 3.46 ± .07) than males (M ± SE = 3.07 ± .08), consistent with 
previous findings (Page & Green, 2007), including those in studies on the Rubber 
Hand Illusion (Longo, et al., 2008).  
The order of presentation of the two conditions (synchronous and 
asynchronous) interacted significantly with the effect of condition (F(1, 252) = 20.16, 
p < .001, p2 = .07), but not with the effect of component. In addition, the between-
subjects effect of order was significant (F(1, 252) = 5.11, p = .025, p2 = .02). Follow-
up one-way ANOVAs revealed a significant different effect across components of the 
asynchronous stimulation for the “synchronous first” (M ± SE = 2.75 ± .07) than for 
the “asynchronous first” (M ± SD = 3.27 ± .08) group (t(254) = 4.9, p < .001). 
However, no different effects after the synchronous stimulation for the “synchronous 
first” (M ± SE = 3.58 ± .09) than for the “asynchronous first” (M ± SE = 3.55 ± .1) 
group were observed (p > .8). Therefore, the significant interaction was driven by the 
groups differing in the asynchronous, but not the synchronous condition. Overall, 
people that were firstly exposed to the asynchronous condition showed higher level 
of agreement with the statements presented right after the asynchronous IMS than 
people that were firstly exposed to the synchronous condition. Still, the main effects 
of condition, component and their interaction hold significant for the full set of 
participants, and also, when analyzing separately for the two groups of participants, 
“synchronous first” and “asynchronous first” (all ps < .001). 
 
 
26 
 
2.2.3 Individual differences: Age 
A further analysis investigated the relation between age and the subjective 
experience of the enfacement illusion. First, we calculated the strength of the 
components of “self-identification”, “similarity” and “affect” by subtracting the scores 
obtained in the asynchronous conditions from those obtained in the synchronous 
conditions. Then, we ran linear regressions for each component to investigate 
whether age was a significant predictor of the change in the experience between 
conditions.  
The linear regression analyses between the difference synchronous vs. 
asynchronous and age revealed (see Figure 3) that lower age predicted larger 
differences between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation for the components 
of “self-identification” and “similarity” (for “self-identification” R2 = .017,  = -.132, 
F(1,255) = 4.48, p = .035; for “similarity” R2 = .023,  = -.150, F(1,255) = 5.88, p = 
.016). As for the other component, “affect”, age was not a significant predictor of the 
change between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation (p > .4).  
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Overall, the pattern of participants’ responses suggests a significantly different 
conscious experience of identification with the other face and of perceived similarity 
between the other person’s and one’s own face during synchronous and 
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation. The different statements loading on the 
component explaining most of the variance in each condition suggest that while 
during synchronous stimulation the conscious experience is that of visual similarity, 
during asynchronous stimulation the conflict between seen and felt sensations gains 
importance. Further, differences in the conscious experience due to individual factors 
such as age were identified. Our results suggest that age predicted the level of 
agreement with the statements comprising the components “self-identification” and 
“similarity”, with younger participants showing a higher level of agreement in the 
synchronous, as compared to the asynchronous, condition than older participants. 
Experiment 2 further investigated individual factors by looking at differences in 
interoceptive sensitivity in the effect of visuo-tactile stimulation on the 
representations of self-face.  
 
3. Experiment 2: Interoceptive sensitivity and the enfacement illusion 
3.1 Material and methods 
3.1.1 Participants  
Fifty six volunteers (43 female; Mage ± SD = 21.18 ± 3.3; range: 17-42) gave 
their informed consent to participate. Participants were students or staff members of 
Royal Holloway, University of London, except for one participant who was a high 
school visitor and for whom parental consent to participate in the study was 
obtained. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committees. 
3.1.2 Apparatus and materials 
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A similar apparatus as in Experiment 1 was used, and similar “induction 
movies”, with the only exception that the movies lasted for 2 minutes. For each 
gender, two different movies, each showing a different model, were produced; each 
movie was presented in either the synchronous or asynchronous condition. The 
order of synchronous and asynchronous conditions and the assignment of movies to 
conditions were counterbalanced across participants. The individuals displayed were 
approximately 19 years old. 
Heart rate was monitored with a piezo-electric pulse transducer attached to 
the participant’s left index finger (PowerLab 26T, AD Instruments, UK). Heart signals 
were sampled at a rate of 1 kHz and amplified.  
3.1.3 Procedure  
Participants took part individually in the experiment. First, participants’ 
heartbeat perception was measured by using the Mental Tracking Method 
(Schandry, 1981), a method that has been widely used as a way to assess 
interoceptive sensitivity. While monitoring participants’ heartbeat, and in four trials of 
different length (25 s, 35 s, 45 s and 100 s), participants were asked to concentrate 
and silently count their own heart beats. Participants were not allowed to take their 
own pulse, did not receive any feedback on their performance and were not informed 
of the length of the trial. An audiovisual cue marked the start and the stop of the trial.  
Then, participants were exposed to two “induction movies”, while the 
experimenter touched their face in synchrony or asynchrony with the seen touch. 
The subjective experience of participants during each visuo-tactile condition was 
assessed with the same questionnaire used in Experiment 1. In this occasion, 
participants rated their level of agreement with the statements using a visual analog 
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scale (VAS) ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, with the middle 
point marked as “neither agree nor disagree”.  
3.2 Results  
In order to investigate how interoceptive sensitivity interacts with the pattern of 
visuo-tactile stimulation, first, for both synchronous and asynchronous conditions, we 
constructed comparable component scores to those identified in Experiment 1: “self-
identification”, “similarity” and “affect”. Each component was calculated by averaging 
the ratings of participants for all the statements that comprise the component 
(average of statements 1-6, 8, 15-17 for “self-identification”, average of statements 
6-7, 10-12 for “similarity” and average of statements 13-14 for “affect”). The ratings 
were translated into a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly 
agree”).  
Interoceptive sensitivity (IS) was calculated as the mean score of the four 
heartbeat detection trials, according to the following formula (Schandry, 1981): 
¼ Σ (1 – ( |recorded_heartbeats – counted_heartbeats| / recorded_heartbeats ) ) 
According to this formula, the IS score can range between 0 and 1, with 
higher scores indicating higher accuracy of the participants in counting their 
heartbeats (i.e., higher IS). We calculated the participants’ median score of IS, and 
used this value (Median ± SD = .72 ± .18) to split participants into two groups of high 
IS (HIGH group, mean IS score ± SD = .86 ± .08; N = 28) and low IS (LOW group, 
mean IS score ± SD = .57 ± .12; N = 28; see Tsakiris, et al., 2011).  
Then, the components scores “self-identification”, “similarity” and “affect” for 
the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, were submitted in a 2x3 ANOVA with 
within-subjects factors condition (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and component 
(“self-identification”, “similarity” or “affect”), and with IS as a between-subjects factor. 
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Results showed that the main effects of condition (F(1, 54) = 50.04, p < .0001, p2 = 
.48) and component (F(2, 108) = 22.3, p < .0001, p2 = .29) were significant, as well 
as the 2-way interaction (F(2, 108) = 9.15, p < .0001, p2 = .14). As in Experiment 1, 
the significant interaction was driven by a greater difference between the 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions for the ratings for the statements 
comprising the component scores “self-identification” (mean difference ± SE = 1.03 ± 
.14; t(55) = 7.5, p < .0001) and “similarity” (mean difference ± SE =.85 ± .15; t(55) = 
5.5, p < .0001) than for those comprising the component score “affect” (mean 
difference ± SE = .35 ± .14; t(55) = 2.5, p = .014). Follow-up paired samples t-tests 
between the calculated difference “synchronous minus asynchronous” for all 
component scores revealed a significant difference between the score “affect” and 
the scores “self-identification” (t(55) = 3.8, p < .0001) and “similarity” (t(49) = 2.7, p = 
.009). These findings replicate the main results of Experiment 1. 
Furthermore, the interaction of condition with the IS group was significant 
(F(1, 54) = 4.11, p < .05, p2 = .07), because as shown in Figure 4, participants with 
low IS gave overall higher ratings to all three components following synchronous 
stimulation (M ± SE = 4.19 ± .14) than participants with high IS (M ± SE = 3.81 ± 
.14), while for both groups ratings following asynchronous stimulation were 
comparable (for low IS, M ± SE = 3.23 ± .16; for high IS, M ± SE = 3.28 ± .16).  
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4. General Discussion 
The current study represents a systematic attempt to characterize the 
different aspects of the experience of identifying with a face. The enfacement illusion 
can be considered a model instance of the effect of multisensory input for the 
formation of a mental representation of one’s face. A structured psychometric 
approach served to reveal the underlying structure of the subjective experience of 
the illusion. Specifically, we identified three major components that emerged during 
synchronous visual and tactile stimulation, and five major components that emerged 
when vision and touch were not synchronous. Unlike the structure of the experience 
in the RHI that seemed to be comparable across synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation (Longo, et al., 2008), the pattern of stimulation on the face resulted in 
qualitative differences. When we investigated the common factor structure across 
stimulation conditions, three major components were identified which we interpreted 
as “self-identification”, “similarity” and “affect”. The rating scores for these three 
components were significantly different between stimulation conditions. In the same 
data set, we investigated the effect of individual differences such as gender and age. 
In terms of age, we found that it was a significant negative predictor of the change in 
the “self-identification” and “similarity” components. Finally, we investigated the 
relation between interoception and conscious experience as a way of understanding 
how the malleability of self-face representations following multisensory stimulation 
might also be modulated by interoceptive sensitivity. Consistent with previous 
findings for other bodily illusions (Tsakiris, et al., 2011), participants with low 
interoceptive sensitivity showed a stronger enfacement illusion following 
synchronous stimulation than participants with high interoceptive sensitivity. The 
present study complements previous research on the behavioral effects of 
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multisensory stimulation on self-face representations (Paladino, et al., 2011; Sforza, 
et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008), by identifying the key 
experiential components that are affected by interpersonal multisensory stimulation. 
Our key findings are discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.1 Differences in the experience of the other’s face during synchronous and 
asynchronous IMS 
Following a similar psychometric approach to a bodily illusion (RHI, Longo, et 
al., 2008) comparable to the enfacement illusion paradigm used here, we analysed 
separately the subjective ratings given after synchronous and asynchronous 
multisensory stimulation. In the RHI, the differences between synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation were mostly quantitative in nature, rather than qualitative, 
because the factor structure was almost identical for both stimulation conditions. For 
the RHI, the key difference was that significant higher ratings were given in the 
synchronous than the asynchronous condition for highly similar structures across 
conditions. Unlike the structure of the conscious experience during the RHI, the two 
PCAs on the enfacement illusion paradigm showed important qualitative differences.  
The first component identified in the two PCAs, which accounted for 
considerably more variance than any of the other components, reflected a 
substantially different experience of the other’s face during synchronous than during 
asynchronous stroking. During the synchronous condition this component related to 
items reflecting an overall visual identification with the other person’s face, including 
physical similarity between both faces, and did not reflect a particular focus on the 
multisensory stimulation itself. However, during the asynchronous condition 
participants strongly focused both on the multisensory stimulation and the feelings of 
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“mirror experience”, without really evaluating other aspects related to the physical 
similarity between the faces. Synchrony seems to bring forward the experience of 
resemblance and similarity, that is the effect of the enfacement illusion, and 
attenuate the focus on the multisensory input, that is the cause of the enfacement 
illusion. Instead, asynchrony seems to disrupt the self-identification process and 
bring forward the focus on the touch and the feeling of control and imitation of the 
other’s face. The fact that the component that explains most of the variance in the 
synchronous condition consists of items that relate to identification, and that this is 
clearly distinct from the component that refers to the sensorimotor experience of the 
face, indicates that the detection of synchrony of multisensory input and the strong 
association established between felt and seen touch automatically suggests visual 
similarity, shifting conscious experience towards visual similarity rather than tactile 
sensation. The emergence of two different components for the experience of 
identifying with the other person’s face and the sensorimotor experience of one’s 
face during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation indicates that, although 
identification with the other person’s face resulted from the multisensory stimulation 
(as our results evidenced), the conscious experience of self-identification did not 
regard this stimulation and other motor aspects of the experience as part of the 
process of self-identification, but rather seemed to put more weight on the visual 
aspect of the experience.  
 
4.2  Common experience of the other’s face during synchronous and 
asynchronous IMS 
Having noted these important qualitative differences in the subjective 
experience across the two conditions, we then investigated their quantitative 
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differences by focusing on the common factor structure as given by the PCA on the 
mean ratings across the two conditions. The analysis investigating the dimensions 
underlying the experience of enfacement which were common to both conditions, 
served to identify the following three components: self-identification, that reflected 
the extent to which participants felt that the seen face was theirs, similarity, that 
reflected the extent to which participants perceived the seen face as similar, and 
affect that reflected the extent to which the seen face was judged as attractive and 
trustworthy. This common structure, which was validated by CFA, allowed us to 
directly compare the magnitude of the experience as reflected in the subjective 
ratings across the two conditions. While synchronous stimulation resulted in overall 
higher ratings than asynchronous stimulation, the difference between the two types 
of stimulation was larger for the first two components than for the third one. The 
component “self-identification” in the current study is reminiscent of the “embodiment 
of the rubber hand” component identified for the RHI (Longo, et al., 2008), which 
derived from the potentially dissociable subcomponents of ownership, location and 
agency. In the current study, no further subcomponents for “self-identification” were 
established. This might reflect the differences in the importance of hand and face-
representations for self-identity.  
The emergence of a separate “affect” component provides evidence that 
feelings of affect towards “the person in the mirror” can be dissociated from feelings 
of self-identification, sensorimotor or similarity experiences associated with 
embodiment of the other person’s face. It should be noted that previous research on 
the RHI identified also a component labeled as “affect” (Longo, et al., 2008), which 
mainly related to the pleasantness of felt touch and thus carries an emotional 
constituent, as does the “affect” factor in this study. Furthermore, the observed 
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distinction between the feelings of self-identification and similarity between faces and 
the feelings of affect towards the “person in the mirror” might be used to refine 
models of abnormal body-awareness where body-image dissatisfaction and body-
image distortions are linked to objectification of one’s body and a separation 
between the subjectivity and physicality of one’s body (Legrand, 2010). The 
observation that interpersonal multisensory stimulation selectively modulates the 
conscious experiences of self-identification and perceived similarity between faces 
more than the experience of affect suggests dissociation between the process of 
identification and the affective relationship with the identified object. 
While effects of multisensory integration on self-face representations are often 
discussed in analogy to its effects on body-representations (see RHI; Longo, et al., 
2008; Sforza, et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008), the 
current use of a psychometric approach highlights important differences between the 
experiences of self-identification and body-ownership. Previous research on the 
experience of embodiment during the RHI has identified a fairly similar structure for 
the experience of embodiment during both conditions of synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation of the rubber hand and one’s own hand, with the 
conditions differing in the extent to which components of the structure were present 
or absent (see Longo, et al., 2008). However, the underlying introspective 
experience during the synchronous and asynchronous conditions of the enfacement 
seems to be substantially different, as evidenced by the current results. A different 
number of components, three for the synchronous and five for the asynchronous 
condition, emerged. Moreover, the factor explaining most of the variance in both 
conditions differed in the type of conscious experience that it described, a focus on 
resemblance and similarity with the other’s face following synchronous stimulation 
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and a focus on the feeling of control and imitation of the other’s face following 
asynchronous stimulation. Finally, a distinct component referring to the “loss of one’s 
face”, emerged only for the asynchronous condition.  
Importantly, although most of the mean responses to the questionnaire items 
in the present study showed ‘disagreement’ with the statements following both 
synchronous and asynchronous IMS, the integration of synchronous vision and 
touch between one’s own face and that of another unfamiliar person evoked 
significant changes in the experience of self-identification, suggesting that 
participants showed less disagreement following synchronous IMS for these 
statements (e.g., “looking at one’s mirror reflection, rather than at someone else”). 
Overall, this pattern is consistent with the reported changes in subjective experience 
in other studies on the influence of multisensory stimulation in face recognition 
(Paladino, et al., 2010; Sforza, et al., 2010). It should be noted that in our study the 
mean value for the critical statement 3 (“I felt like the other’s face was my face”) is 
numerically higher than the one reported in a previous study using the same 
question (Sforza, et al., 2010). The pattern of results is also consistent with that 
reported for other bodily illusions that use multisensory stimulation (Longo, et al., 
2008; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris & Haggard, 2009), although it seems that 
other bodily illusions (e.g. RHI) produce stronger phenomenological effects, as 
reported by participants. 
 
4.3 Individual differences in age 
Our results revealed that lower age predicted larger changes in the 
experience of identification and of perceived similarity between another person’s and 
one’s own face. Younger participants expressed more agreement with the 
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statements comprising the factors “self-identification” and “similarity” in the 
synchronous, as compared to the asynchronous, condition. This finding seems to 
suggest that, for the age range examined, the plasticity of self-face representations 
reduces with age, a finding which might be explained in terms of the increasing 
number of mirror experiences accumulated with age and also in terms of a greater 
need to adapt self-face representations to the larger body changes during certain 
age periods. Larger body changes occur during adolescence and into early 
adulthood and then again in later adulthood (i.e., after 40 years old; see Bishara, 
2000; Farkas, et al., 2004). The age of the sample we report ranges from 17 to 38 
years old. Therefore, the younger participants in our sample would be experiencing 
larger changes in their facial appearance, requiring a higher degree of plasticity in 
the mental representation of their face that would allow the assimilation of these 
changes. In line with this observation, the youngest members of the group 
experienced the strongest enfacement illusion, which may reflect the greater degree 
of plasticity of self-face representations.  
This adaptation may help to ensure that a continuous sense of self is kept 
even though one’s body changes. Similarly, as the number of accumulated mirror 
experiences increases and the rate of change in one’s physical appearance changes 
with age, the mental representation of one’s face becomes less malleable and more 
stable. The significant correlation found between age and the malleability of the 
mental representation of one’s face evidences the self-updating of mental body-
representations, thus strengthening the theoretical framework of mental body-
representation that we propose, in which self-identification, self-recognition, and self-
updating are identified as three distinct key processes. 
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4.4 Interoceptive sensitivity and the strength of self-representations  
Finally, Experiment 2 revealed that interoceptive sensitivity (IS) modulated the 
strength of the experience of enfacement. People with low IS seemed to experience 
in the enfacement illusion a stronger sense of identification with the other face, of 
perceived similarity between the other and self-face and of affect towards the other 
person, than people with high IS, thus showing a link between the plasticity of self-
face representations and IS. Importantly, given the significant interaction between 
stimulation pattern (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and IS group (low vs. high), it 
seems unlikely that the two groups generally interpreted or used the Likert scale in 
different ways. Instead, across components, participants with low IS gave higher 
ratings after synchronous stimulation compared to those with high IS, whereas for 
the asynchronous condition we did not find such differences. A significant negative 
correlation between IS and the strength of bodily illusions has been previously 
reported for the RHI, suggesting that IS is linked to the malleability of body-
ownership (Tsakiris, et al., 2011). Low accuracy in heartbeat perception correlated 
with an increase in sense of ownership during the RHI as measured introspectively, 
behaviorally, and physiologically (Tsakiris, et al., 2011), and was related to an 
increase in self-face identification, perceived similarity between faces and affect 
towards the other face, in the enfacement illusion, as measured introspectively in the 
present study. Recent studies have provided evidence for both a top-down effect of 
changes in the experience of body-ownership on homeostatic regulation of the body 
(Moseley, et al., 2008), as well as a bottom-up modulation of the peripheral 
physiological state of the body (Kammers, et al., 2011) and the sensitivity to it 
(Tsakiris, et al., 2011), on the malleability of body-ownership. This suggests a 
relation between the conscious experience of the self and the physiological 
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regulation of the body, in addition to the well-documented role of multisensory input 
on the conscious experience of the self. The present study provides further evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that the sensitivity to the body from within is linked to the 
malleability of self-representations, in the domain of self-face representations, as 
well as in the domain of body-representations. This extension from body-ownership 
to self-identification supports that argument that interoceptive sensitivity is linked to 
the strength of self-representation in general.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Overall, the present results corroborate the hypothesis that different 
representations of the bodily self, such as body-ownership and self-identification, rely 
on similar basic mechanisms of multisensory integration (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; 
Tsakiris, 2010). However, the structure of the experience of body-ownership and 
self-face identification might be different. In the RHI, experience centers on the 
change of the representation of one’s own body from an embodied first-person 
perspective. The experimental paradigm of enfacement addresses the question of 
self-identification, whereby a visual representation of appearance is assimilated in a 
mental representation of identity. This process requires the integration of both first 
and third person perspectives, since the subject identifies itself with a visual object, 
i.e., a face, on the basis of current multisensory input. As argued at the beginning of 
this paper, unlike the experience of one’s body from an embodied 1st person 
perspective, the experience of self-identification with the body reflected in the mirror 
requires matching one’s sensorimotor experience (1st person perspective) with the 
observed sensorimotor behavior of the object seen in the mirror (3rd person 
perspective). The formation of a mental representation of one’s visual appearance 
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then follows from this matching between felt and observed sensorimotor signals. Our 
results highlight the differences between bodily illusions that affect the 1st person 
embodied perspective, such as the RHI, and those that affect identification, such as 
the experimental induction of out-of-body experience (Lenggenhager, Tadi, 
Metzinger & Blanke, 2007) and the body-swap illusion (Ehrsson, 2007; Petkova & 
Ehrsson, 2008). The latter require the integration of the “subjectively felt” and 
“objectively seen” self that will result in the formation of a mental representation of 
one’s physical appearance. In that way, the “I” comes to be identified with “me”, 
allowing this “me” to be represented as an object for the others, but also for one’s 
own self, and allowing me to recognize myself as the person in the mirror.  
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